小蓝视频

The Trump/Vance campaign鈥檚 position on the Russian-Ukraine war is that the US should pursue a rapid settlement of the conflict.听Vance has repeatedly stated that the extensive Western military and economic assistance to Ukraine is not part of a clear strategy that would bring Ukraine closer to achieving the objective of regaining the territory it has lost since 2013.听A Trump/Vance administration would likely signal that further US assistance to Ukraine would not be coming and that the conflict should be settled on terms favorable to Russia.听They have not indicated just how much they are willing to concede to the Russian side or what concessions it might take to get Russia to cease its assault on Ukrainian territory and infrastructure.听They have simply made it clear that Ukrainian victory is not possible and should not be set out as a priority of US policy.

The Harris/Walz position is somewhat less clear.听President Biden has always been the main principal when it comes to deciding most foreign policy issues and, especially, on policy toward Russia and Ukraine.听VP Harris has not played a significant role in forming US policy toward the war. At the Presidential Debate, Harris signaled that there was no difference between her position on the war and the position of the Biden administration. She stated that it was a vital national interest of the United States to assist democracies in defending themselves against external aggression and that her administration would continue to support Ukraine and do whatever possible to make sure that Russia would fail in its efforts to expand its territory and force political changes in Ukraine. She has notably linked this position to the interests of the Polish-American voters in swing states. Neither Harris nor Walz has mentioned the need for a cease-fire or any effort to end the fighting.

-SIS professor Keith Darden

Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump have strikingly different foreign policy approaches. Trump sees the world in zero-sum terms, wants to increase barriers between the United States and other countries, and places no value on democracy or human rights. Harris believes the United States is strengthened through cooperation with other countries and favors an engaged approach to the world that advances America鈥檚 security and values.

Trump鈥檚 slogan, 鈥淎merica first,鈥� reflects his nationalistic and insular foreign policy orientation. Immigration and trade are the foreign policy issues that animate Trump the most, and on each of these issues he favors extreme steps to protect the United States from a perceived foreign threat. On immigration, he is for 鈥渢he largest deportation in the history of our country.鈥� On trade, he imposing tariffs of 10 to 20 percent on all US imports. Trump also displays little commitment to America鈥檚 long-standing allies and partners. He has toyed with withdrawing from and shows more interest in cozying up to than in building strong relationships with democratic leaders.

Harris, by contrast, thinks the United States should continue to play an active and leading role in the world to address pressing challenges and promote American ideals. In her August at the Democratic National Convention, she said America must be 鈥渟teadfast in advancing our security and values abroad,鈥� and she highlighted the importance of the United States standing on the side of freedom in the 鈥渆nduring struggle between democracy and tyranny.鈥� She places great value on US and believes the United States should stand firmly on the side of in its struggle to defend itself against Russian aggression. In the , she strongly supports Israel鈥檚 right to defend itself and strongly supports Palestinian rights.

Few presidential campaigns have witnessed the leading candidates voicing such different foreign policy visions. Given these marked contrasts, the outcome of the election will matter greatly not only for Americans but for people .

-SIS professor Jordan Tama

Kamala Harris'听听on tech and cybersecurity issues鈥攕panning her time as a senator, California's attorney general, and now vice president鈥攐ffers useful insight into how a Harris-Walz administration might handle cybersecurity issues. Her focus has consistently been on prosecuting those behind cyber exploitation schemes and holding tech companies accountable for security flaws in their products. As president I expect her to prioritize addressing scammers, cybercriminals, and state-sponsored hackers, with a strong emphasis on protecting critical infrastructure and enforcing cybersecurity laws.

Her running mate, Tim Walz, also has a听听of prioritizing cybersecurity as governor of Minnesota. In 2022, he played a key role in advocating for the Biden administration to avoid federal measures that could complicate state-level cybersecurity efforts. That same year, he issued an executive order directing Minnesota state agencies to bolster their cybersecurity defenses and safeguard critical infrastructure. More recently, he signed a data privacy law aimed at further protecting residents' information from cyber threats. I expect him to maintain this focus as vice president and be a strong advocate for a states-led approach to cybersecurity in a Harris-Walz administration.

Unlike other issues, cybersecurity is mostly nonpartisan so there are many similarities between the Harris-Walz and Trump-Vance approaches to cybersecurity. For instance, both campaigns see value in enhancing national cyber defenses and reducing vulnerabilities. Nevertheless,听. While the Harris-Walz team tends to lean toward government-led regulatory measures, the Trump-Vance team prefers more private sector-driven solutions. For example, the Harris-Walz team is partial to close government oversight of tech firms but the Trump-Vance team advocates for less regulation on tech firms, aiming to promote innovation and protect U.S. interests without overburdening companies with compliance.听

The Trump-Vance ticket has also signaled a more defensive posture on cybersecurity, with a strong emphasis on countering cyber threats from China and curbing its growing technological influence. The U.S. Department of Justice under the first Trump administration issued a听听against domestic and foreign-based hackers in response to high-profile cyber incidents like the HBO, Sony, and Yahoo data breaches. While chances are slim that these indicted hackers (especially the foreign-based state-backed ones) will ever see the inside of a courtroom, the indictments may nonetheless be useful as a deterrence against future cyber breaches. I would expect more of these aggressive tactics during a second Trump administration.

-SIS professor William Akoto

Neither campaign has been terribly clear regarding their vision for US trade policy, but we can expect either administration to follow a trend line based on the last time their party was in the White House.

A Trump/Vance Administration seems intent to significantly and broadly raise tariffs on countries that they perceive to be taking advantage of the US in trade policy.听While these policies are often articulated as focusing on conventional US adversaries such as China, placing tariffs on US partners and allies in Europe does听not seem off the table.听This predilection for protectionism seems to flow from one of two logics.听First, Trump believes that tariffs are a good way to extract concessions from trade partners, and while this seems conceivable as it follows some of the logic underlying the threat and imposition of economic sanctions historically, tariffs have so far not been a clearly effective method to extract concessions - either economic or political听- from other countries, as those countries often elect simply to retaliate with protectionist measures of their own, sometimes with the implicit or explicit approval of the international trade regime, as retaliatory听tariffs are seen as a legitimate countermeasure in international trade law.听Second, Trump seems to believe that the imposition of tariffs is a mechanism by which other countries contribute revenue to the federal government, which is patently false since tariffs are paid by importers (usually domestic firms) who often pass the bulk of the tariff on to the consumer in the form of a higher price.听So, revenue does increase, but not because other countries are paying it.听Such imported goods might still end up being cheaper relative to domestic goods, which is why they continue to be imported, but they are more expensive relative to pre-tariff import goods, thereby representing a decrease in purchasing power,听ceteris paribus, for US domestic consumers.

A Harris/Walz Administration would appear to take a more nuanced approach to trade policy that does not altogether eschew protectionist measures and can best be described in three strands.听First, a Harris/Walz Administration seems highly likely to keep many of the protectionist measures imposed by the Biden Administration in place, many of which are a continuation of Trump policies.听This is a bit of an albatross for the Democratic Party, which I suppose would like to market itself as the more trade-friendly party and decouple itself from Trump Administration policies, but path dependency and voter anchoring can best explain the state of affairs, and it is the same reason why tax cuts rarely expire.听Second, a Harris/Walz Administration seems intent on placing tariffs on foreign goods for which it believes the US must carve out a dominant strategic position, such as with microchips and electric vehicles,听in a process often described as "de-risking."听Finally, a Harris/Walz Administration would seem听to exhibit more of a preference for conventional US allies and partners in global trade policy at the expense of strategic adversaries like China and Russia, signifying that trade policy would be less transactional and thus reify听many of the听geopolitical fault lines ossified since the Russian invasion of Ukraine.听

One thing that is clear is that neither administration would seem intent on restoring the kind of neoliberal free trade consensus that dominated US domestic politics during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations.听Regardless of whether one considers it a good or bad thing, economic protectionism is in vogue once again on both sides of the aisle.听As such, the differentiation between the parties is one of magnitude rather than direction.听Both administrations would seem likely to increase protectionism in the aggregate, but a Harris/Walz Administration could be expected to do so to a possibly significantly lesser extent.

-SIS professor Michael Stanaitis

In the words of our colleague Jim Goldgeier, and his co-author Elizabeth Saunders, NATO will indeed be . That is because, unlike some other foreign policy areas, such as China, we can expect very sharp and clear distinctions between how Donald Trump and Kamala Harris would approach the Atlantic Alliance if elected President.

Former President Donald Trump has a long history of deriding NATO. During the 2016 campaign, he routinely called the Alliance 听complained about burden sharing among allies, and he even 鈥� the core collective security provision 鈥� for allies not meeting spending levels. During his time in office, Trump stuck to the same tune, , and he allegedly . While NATO did make inroads in bolstering its Eastern flank in that period, Trump鈥檚 time in office was primarily defined by internal turmoil and limited cohesion within the Alliance.

Since leaving office, Trump鈥檚 attitude toward NATO has hardly mellowed. On the campaign trail in 2024, he has , and caused a stir when adding that Russia could 鈥溾�� to member states not spending enough on defense. Furthermore, he has also hinted that 听and that he could 听without explaining how he might achieve that feat.

Donald Trump is notoriously difficult to predict and tends to blow hot and cold. It is not clear, for instance, whether he would go as far as a complete withdrawal from NATO. But, even if that scenario were not to happen, Trump would be likely to disengage and de-emphasize NATO, leading to greater tension within the Alliance.

Unlike a Trump administration, a Harris victory in November would likely mean predictability and continuity as far as US policy toward NATO. So far, the Vice President has not signaled any intent to deviate from the approach taken by the Biden administration for the past four years.

Joe Biden, , committed to repair alliances, after the turbulent Trump years, and sought to avoid the public attacks against rivals. The transatlantic partnership was certainly not free from hiccups and disputes in recent years, such as over the or the ; but Biden did invest heavily to keep NATO united in its response to Russia鈥檚 full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Harris鈥� rhetoric in the past year only reaffirmed this strong attachment to the Atlantic Alliance. During the Munich Security Conference, in February, she stated that 鈥�our sacred commitment to NATO remains ironclad鈥� and that 鈥�NATO is the greatest military alliance the world has ever known.鈥� Harris has also firmly emphasized her continued support for Ukraine, attending its peace summit in June,听and .

In other words, we should not expect a great shift toward NATO during a Kamala Harris administration, which would continue to view the alliance as fundamental to US foreign policy. That said, the new President might be open to shifts on specific issues, such as paving the way for Ukraine to join NATO or allowing authorities in Kyiv to strike at deep targets in Russia.

- SIS professor听Garret J. Martin

Although the position of the two presidential candidates on the ongoing war on Gaza can be perceived as significantly different by some observers, when taking a closer look at the two, it becomes clear that they both will continue to provide weapons to Israel to continue its massive attacks. Further, they both will not take serious action to end the blockade on the Palestinian civilians in Gaza. They both emphasize the need to release the Israeli hostages as a priority over anything else, and both candidates ignore Palestinian prisoners, including the massive numbers of women and children who are imprisoned, and others who are being killed in Gaza. In their debate, they both unequivocally stated and even competed to prove their commitment to support Israel despite its disproportionate military responses and attacks that have amounted to crimes in Gaza and Lebanon.

Nevertheless, they differ in their public support for Netanyahu. Harris has given less praise and skipped attending his speech to Congress (but met with him privately), while Trump has endorsed Netanyahu鈥檚 war on Gaza and urged him to achieve the objectives and "finish the job.鈥� Harris has clearly expressed her support for a two-state solution while Trump has been silent on this issue during his campaign. Since March 2024, and in the presidential debate, Harris called for an immediate cease-fire and symbolically or partially recognized the suffering of the Palestinian side. Trump has ignored all the human suffering on the Palestinian side and did not state his commitment to a two-state solution.

Regardless of the above differences and similarities between the two candidates, their actions and statements have certainly failed to stop the war or enforce the belated UN call for a ceasefire. The two candidates are perceived by many Americans, especially young, Muslim and Arab voters as complacent or even directly implicated with the war crimes in Gaza and Lebanon.

-SIS professor Mohammed Abu-Nimer

I'll start with a disclaimer: Forecasting policy stances is tricky in the middle of an election campaign and in the middle of a war that escalates and expands by the day.

In principle, Harris鈥檚 positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Middle East more broadly seem to be rather similar to her predecessor, but there might be some nuance to them that could result in important changes. Currently, Harris is careful in pronouncing these differences鈥攂oth because she is still the Vice President and because of electoral considerations. She will likely be less careful after the elections听should she win. Like Biden, Harris is likely to continue being a strong supporter of Israel, on the one hand, and to push for a negotiated end of the war on the other. That end would include the release of the Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, an IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the creation of a Palestinian government not controlled by Hamas, and the start of the rehabilitation of Gaza. Like Biden, she would like to tie this end of the immediate war to a longer-term process to create an independent Palestinian state next to Israel and a regional reconciliation. I believe, though, that Harris will be much more forceful and public about this policy and more willing to coerce Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to end the war. The US has many tools to affect such an end, and while Biden hesitated to use these tools, Harris is likely to be more willing to use them towards what she sees as the common interest of Israel and the Palestinians.

Trump is much harder to predict on this topic, as oftentimes considerations of ego and shallow understanding of the conflict from both Trump and his advisors prevent the formation of a coherent policy. Trump had some conflict with Netanyahu over the 鈥渁udacity鈥� of the latter to congratulate President Joe Biden after his election win. Nevertheless, these issues have now been cleared, and Trump is likely to be (like in his first term) a full-throated supporter of Netanyahu鈥檚 policies. Netanyahu鈥檚 current policy is to keep the war(s) going on as much as possible for the benefit of his political and personal political goals. Trump鈥檚 support of Netanyahu and his policy is likely to remain consistent, despite throwing around some vague hints about ending the war as soon as he is President. Those statements are meant to steal some voices of Arab Americans away from Harris. If the war will somehow affect Trump鈥檚 personal business dealings听then his considerations might change in the future.

-SIS professor Boaz Atzili

There are some striking differences between the proposed energy and climate platforms and records of Vice President Harris and former President Trump.

Harris cast the tie-breaking vote on the Inflation Reduction Act, enabling the Biden Administration to direct historic amounts of government spending to climate- and energy-related infrastructure, and she has made advancing environmental justice and facilitating global cooperation on climate change central pillars of her presidential campaign platform.

Trump, meanwhile, during his first term in office, withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement, pushed to roll back dozens of settled environmental laws and regulations, installed a climate change denier as head of the Environmental Protection Agency and former chief executive officer of ExxonMobil as Secretary of State, and routinely cast climate change as a hoax. The Trump campaign website has no mention of climate change, but instead, in all caps, 鈥�Cancel the electric vehicle mandate and cut costly and burdensome regulations.鈥�

It is no real surprise that environmental groups largely back Harris, calling her a 鈥�.鈥� The prevailing sense is that a second Trump term would be a disaster for the climate, while a Harris presidency would see a continuation of Biden-era climate responses.

At the same time, some environmental groups have made the case that Biden-era policies and spending do not go far enough, and there are in fact striking between Harris and Trump when it comes to energy policy. Harris has recently endorsed fracking as a way to access oil and gas resources, after earlier claiming support for a fracking ban. Under the Biden administration, US oil and natural gas production have surged to record highs, getting a jump-start on the Trump (again all-caps) , 鈥淢ake America the dominant energy producer in the world, by far!鈥�

Bottom line 鈥� a Harris presidency will be better for the climate than a Trump presidency. The climate, though, and those facing climate change impacts need more from a Harris presidency than is currently being proposed.

- SIS professor Simon Nicholson

For further reading, check out this in The Globe Post by Director of the 小蓝视频 Center for Environment, Community & Equity and SIS professor Dana Fisher in which she argues that Kamala Harris must prioritize phasing out fossil fuels if she听wins the White House.

Appealing to union members has been a centerpiece of the presidential campaigns of both Kamala Harris and Donald Trump. Union members are a substantial share of the electorate in the swing states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Nevada. Union members have historically favored the Democratic Party by significant margins since the 1930s, but this has narrowed since the 1960s. Many union members have found Donald Trump鈥檚 emphasis on immigration, protectionism, and traditional values as well as his gruff behavior particularly attractive. In 2020, 56 percent of the members of union households voted for Joe Biden versus 40 percent for Donald Trump. This 16-point advantage was double the margin that Hilary Clinton received in 2016 but two points less than Barack Obama鈥檚 union edge in 2012.

Both presidential candidates chose running mates 鈥� JD Vance and Tim Walz 鈥� whom they hoped would appeal to traditional union members. Walz was a union member when he was a teacher. Both presidential candidates offer policies that appeal to union members, but their proposals and track records differ substantially. In practice, Harris has supported unions. The same cannot be said for Trump.

The AFL-CIO, the largest peak confederation of trade unions in the United States, has rated 98 percent of Kamala Harris鈥檚 key votes as a United States Senator to be pro-labor. Tim received a rating of 93 percent for his votes when he was a member of Congress. As Governor of Minnesota, Walz enacted a paid sick-leave requirement and a minimum wage for rideshare drivers. JD Vance, in contrast, garnered a zero-percent rating.

The pro-union track-record of the Biden-Harris administration, which has included a major package to rescue union pension funds; massive investments in clean technologies, infrastructure, and computer-chip manufacturing; substantially increasing the funding for agencies that deal with labor affairs like the Department of Labor and the National Labor Relations Board; appointing individuals to key positions in those agencies who are sympathetic to organized labor; issuing reports on how to increase worker representation and unionization; and explicit support for unions in numerous contract talks have led most labor observers to judge Joe Biden to have the most union friendly administration since Franklin Roosevelt.

Donald Trump, in contrast, has a mixed record. On the one hand, his administration implemented substantial tariff increases, which has been a longstanding demand by many unions, and increased the domestic content and worker protection provisions in the US, Canada, Mexico Agreement (USMCA) that replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement. Trump has also promised to eliminate the income tax for tips and overtime pay. Harris has also promised to do the former in a more restricted way, but not the latter. On the other hand, Trump appointees to the National Labor Relations Board formed the majority for numerous rulings that favored employers over unions. The Trump administration cut the budget of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, reduced the number of OSHA inspectors, and refused to issue workplace safety guidelines to address the COVID pandemic. Moreover, in 2018 Trump signed three executive orders that curtailed the labor rights of the almost one million federal employees who are union members. Two years later, Trump enacted another executive order known as Schedule F that gutted civil service job protections. Biden rescinded both these measures. On the campaign trail, Trump has bragged about not paying overtime to employees and praised billionaire Elon Musk for firing workers who have tried to organize at his businesses, which is illegal.

Despite the contrast between the two candidates on labor issues, it is not clear how the union vote will fall this time. Most unions have endorsed Kamala Harris, but a few 鈥� most prominently the International Brotherhood of Teamsters 鈥� have declined to endorse either candidate. Rank-and-file support for Trump is strong in many quarters. It is certain, however, that the union vote will matter a great deal in November.

- SIS professor Stephen Silvia