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Discussion portion of event

小蓝视频鈥檚 Center for Security, Innovation, and New Technology and the Hudson Institute co-hosted a dialogues between Distinguished Professor Audrey Kurth Cronin, Hudson Asia-Pacific Security Chair Dr. Patrick M. Cronin and distinguished military historian Professor Sir Hew Strachan on 31 August 2022.听Strachan discussed the causes and consequences of war against the backdrop of recent conflicts, the broader sweep of European experience, and the foundations of Western military strategic thinking. The 鈥減ost-9/11 wars鈥� should prompt Western military thought to reconsider Carl von Clausewitz鈥檚 presumption that war is the continuation of policy by other means. Characterized by early operational successes that promised quick victories, interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya gave way to protracted conflict, leading to unsatisfactory outcomes at best and outright defeat at worst. These wars demand a more critical examination of the links between the causes and consequences of war. The interventions should also challenge current strategic thought, which aligns ends, ways, and means in a continuum that rarely applies in practice. War鈥檚 place in international relations theory has too often been characterized by unfounded expectations of an ideal rarely achieved in practice than by realism founded on actual experience.

A video of the event is available .听

Disclaimer:听Transcript has been edited for clarity.

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Patrick Cronin:

Well Hew, thank you so much. The breadth of your remarks, the depth of your scholarship are always edifying and a treat for us. This is a bit of a hybrid conversation. Half lecture and then conversation. Sort of like hybrid war. We鈥檝e sort of sneaked in a lecture here. But we鈥檙e richer for it, Hew. I want to turn to Audrey to ask the first question.

Audrey Kurth Cronin:

It鈥檚 an honor. Hew, I was thinking when you talked about 鈥渨ars of unification,鈥� that鈥檚 exactly the phrase that Putin uses. So looking at it-

Patrick Cronin:

[interjects] Good point.

Audrey Kurth Cronin:

From the other side-

Sir Hew Strachan:

[interjects] Sure, yep.

Audrey Kurth Cronin:

I鈥檓 not endorsing it, but-

Sir Hew Strachan:

[interjects] No, no, no, no.

Audrey Kurth Cronin:

I wanted to ask you something that鈥檚 very American and civil-military relations oriented. You know I spent many years teaching at the National War College. I鈥檓 going to go into territory that I tread on very tentatively, because it鈥檚 yours. I鈥檓 sure you鈥檒l find things that are wrong in my interpretation. But as you know, Clausewitz鈥檚 famous dictum, 鈥淲ar is a continuation of鈥︹�� and the next German word is听鈥减辞濒颈迟颈办鈥�. You鈥檙e mainly using the word 鈥減olicy鈥� there, although you do refer to politics elsewhere in your remarks. Whereas I think it鈥檚 also fair to say that the phrase translated into English could be, 鈥淲ar is a continuation of politics.鈥�
One of the reasons why Clausewitz is so popular in the United States courses is that Michael Howard and Peter Paret published their English translation of听On War听with the word 鈥減olicy鈥� in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. The Army, and other services as well, were very disappointed and angry about having lost that war, and they felt the loss of the war was the result of civilian leadership and bad policy. So that translation very well suited them.

I honestly don鈥檛 think that the United States would have begun teaching Clausewitz in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, in the way that it does now, had it not been for the arrival of that brilliant translation in 1976, in the midst of all that.

So that is background to what I really wanted to ask you about: In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, I think we鈥檙e in a similar period now in the United States. Yet I think using the word 鈥減olitics鈥� may better suit Clausewitz鈥檚 book one, chapter one argument about the important role of the passions of the people. The word policy kind of leaves that out of it, doesn鈥檛 it?

So my question is, putting aside the war in Iraq, where I completely agree with you about the lack of a clear policy. With the war in Afghanistan, I鈥檇 argue that it was not a war of 鈥減olicy鈥� at all. It was a war of politics from the beginning, and that war was brutally forced upon the United States. There was no linear development of policy in 2001, nor could there be.

There was a broad renaming of it, as we went forward, as a 鈥淕lobal War on Terror鈥� (against the opposition of people like me, frankly); but the passions of the American people drove the war in Afghanistan. Then politics drove mission creep, which changed the military objective from eliminating al-Qaeda, which is what it should have been, to again regime change and democratization.

So my question is, how does your argument fit particularly the U.S. role in the war in Afghanistan?

Sir Hew Strachan:

Well, I take the point absolutely about the importance of the need to come back to indeed the problems of the Howard and Paret translation. Michael Howard was always an enthusiast in defense of the use of the word policy. I think you probably heard him make this argument at Oxford, as he commonly did and where this precisely arose. I鈥檝e been thinking about it and writing about it again recently, and with Michael鈥檚 death, it has become easier to do these things.

It is clear that he and Peter Paret wanted听鈥减辞濒颈迟颈办鈥�听translated as 鈥減olicy.鈥� That鈥檚 very odd, particularly for Peter Paret, because he absolutely understood how important the passion side of war was to Clausewitz. How much Clausewitz hated the French. How this was a war in which people would have to be mobilized, in which there would need to be public participation, and he鈥攏ot least thanks to the noted recent biography of Marie von Br眉hl, of Clausewitz鈥檚 wife, which brings out just how much she was central to the debates during his life about politics鈥攈e was very political. He was bound to be an important character politically.

When you actually swap sides and fight for the other side, as Clausewitz did in 1812 against the Prussians, then you realize just how insubordinate a colonel can behave. Imagine that happening in the U.S. context now!
So how does that work out in relation to governments? Well, I think it鈥檚 not just how you portray Afghanistan鈥攕orry, how you portray the听American response听to Afghanistan. It鈥檚 how you portray Afghanistan itself, because the politics within Afghanistan (if you read Carter Malkasian鈥檚 book for example) were absolutely rife with tribal loyalties, all the competition within the government. All that Afghan politics is likewise essential to the outcome of the war.

The last time I went to Afghanistan was in 2016. I stayed one week with the British Army, most of the time with the Second Gurkhas. And the second week I stayed with Afghans. One evening, my Afghan host came in and said, 鈥淗ew, Hew, there鈥檚 been a coup.鈥� I said, 鈥淔unny, because I don鈥檛 think there鈥檚 been a coup.鈥� He said, 鈥淣o, but it feels like that every day.鈥� What he was talking about was the tension between [Ashraf] Ghani and [Abdullah] Abdullah, which just tore that government apart. And at that stage, I thought we were going to fail in Afghanistan, not because of the Taliban, but because of the ruptures within the Afghan government.

It鈥檚 not about corruption and all the charges that were leveled against Ghani. It was simply the division in the government itself; and of course the problem there was that the U.S. had itself acted politically, ultimately politically, in supporting Ghani as its choice for president, over Abdullah, just as it had supported Karzai. So it鈥檚 not just the politics of the U.S. that played out there. It鈥檚 the politics of Afghanistan and the reciprocal effects of those two things, that were going both ways.

So is the implication of the question, Audrey, that if we had translated, or if Michael Howard and Peter Paret had translated听politik听as politics more often (they certainly got the context right when Clausewitz might be thinking about politics, which he undoubtedly was from time to time, though when he is thinking very specifically about politics, as he is in some of his histories, then he does use a different word; he talks essentially about politics and the pathway to politics), then if we had been more open about that [i.e., the key role of politics], then the United States鈥� use of force would have been different?

When we talk about proper reactions to 9/11, absolutely it was imperative to do something. You could not have done nothing about the 9/11 attacks, I entirely accept that. The question is thinking through what you do do in a coherent and logical way and recognizing the consequences. And if you have that groundswell of popular support for military action, which is what we are now confronting certainly in many European states with respect to the war in Ukraine (or has been there in the course of this year), the popular passions are running ahead perhaps of a sense of political reality and reason.

On the other hand, policies have political effects. So, are the people really the holders of policy? Are they in some ways closer to what in the Clausewitzian trinity terms turns into the dominant position? So and how far from the government, except in theory, [can the people] remain distinct from that, when you have a crisis to which a democratic society is going to have to respond? That policy/politics distinction is easier for someone like Clausewitz to retain because he is still thinking of a pre-modern-day strategy. But we have a modern-day strategy. So how do we actually indicate it there?

Patrick Cronin:

It鈥檚 a great question, Audrey and there鈥檚 a great backstory here with Colonel Colin Powell at the War College and my former boss, my first boss out of Oxford, John Collins. I was reading Clausewitz for him and condensing it and doing everything wrong. Sorry about that, Hew. I have to apologize to you right now.

Sir Hew Strachan:

You were in good company at the time. Everybody was doing it, including me.

Patrick Cronin:

At least I was trying to make sense of it.

I want to come back to the causes of war now. Disconnected from Clausewitz, for which you rightly say, it was more about the conduct of war, not the causes of war. Yes, disconnected from even the consequences, in terms of policy.
But let鈥檚 think about the thousands of books written about World War I and its origins鈥攐f which yours are the best, of course. Yet there鈥檚 still no agreement on the causes of World War I and here is something that has been exhaustively examined. I want to make the distinction of course, that Clausewitz does between the unchanging nature of war鈥攁nd maybe we can鈥檛 go beyond Thucydides in terms of fear, honor and interest鈥攁nd the changing and variable character of individual wars.

But with the causes of World War I, do we start in the 1870s, with the creation of the German state? Or do we start with Sarajevo and the assassinations? The reason I want to ask that question is, in part, to go back to Ukraine. Where does the Ukraine War begin? Did it really just begin on February 24th?

So I wonder if you can comment on the causes of war in terms of your own work and Ukraine.

Sir Hew Strachan:

Yeah. No, just a short question. Where do I start?

A general point first: Where you are now tends to be of course where you are when you read history. So I think there is a way in which we see different things in the past as we read Clausewitz now, than how it was read in the past, because we have different preoccupations. Those are preoccupations which Clausewitz also happens to speak to, which none of us, including Michael Howard and Peter Paret, fully recognized in 1976. But now their preoccupations are outdated because our preoccupations have moved on beyond the Cold War.

But a specific point about the First World War, is that I suspect that in part, of course, you鈥檙e absolutely right. It鈥檚 about the role of long-term causation, versus short-term contingency and what happens actually in the July Crisis. And this is definitely relevant to the Ukraine question. So when people wanted to prove German war guilt in 1918, they looked at the July Crisis. But when it came to exonerating the Germans, they looked at long-term process of German unification.

Then paradoxically of course, when [German historian Fritz] Fischer wrote, he still used a medium-term distance to make the calls and argue, and he brought the July Crisis and German unification together.

If you read Christopher Clark鈥檚听The Sleepwalkers听and Margaret Macmillan鈥檚 book on the causes of war听The War That Ended Peace, they say almost nothing about the July Crisis at all. How you can understand the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 without explaining the July Crisis is totally beyond me. I just, I鈥檓 sorry. I respect both their works enormously, but it does seem to me that their publishers are breathing down the back of their necks and telling them to get their books in quickly. The July Crisis is important because contingency matters.

Now what I think has happened, in terms of the long-term debate, is that there was a period when Germany was guilty. There was a period when Germany was not guilty. There was a period when Germany was guilty again. Now we鈥檙e in one of those stages where Germany is not so guilty, and we鈥檒l be back shortly. It鈥檚 a bit like the causes of the French Revolution and no doubt, the causes of American Independence. There鈥檒l be some variations in interpretation. Or the American Civil War鈥攖he first American Civil War, just to be sure there is no doubt about what I am referring to.

Let鈥檚 look at Ukraine. Well absolutely, war did not begin in February 2022鈥�. But it鈥檚 an indication of our own myopia. It began effectively in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea, because that period in 2014 was the last point we could have seriously stood up and confronted Russia and supported Ukraine in any sensible terms with a chance of deterrence holding.

I remember very clearly (and I won鈥檛 name names), but I was in a meeting just before having a听NATO听summit, in a British government department, and a senior official was briefing a group of us on a defense review, and the official said, 鈥淭he one thing we鈥檙e not talking about is Ukraine and let鈥檚 be absolutely clear.鈥� In other words, it was off the agenda. In a way, we鈥檙e thinking, 鈥淲hy are we here? What have we come about?鈥�

But of course, others would say that it goes back to 2008. Others will say it goes back to 1994. Or back to James Baker and promises made. So there鈥檚 a long history. [Cold War Historian] Mary Sarotte will no doubt give us the answer to the question [as to when the Ukraine war began].. But, why does it take so long?

Patrick Cronin:

Audrey, do you have another question?

Audrey Kurth Cronin:

A quick one. Americans use technology to try to reduce casualties, and that鈥檚 one way of managing politics. So technology has been very important in Ukraine, and I鈥檓 not even talking about technology on the battlefield. I would talk more about Starlink and the ability to maintain the Ukrainian people鈥檚 connection to the internet, that鈥檚 given [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelenskyy the ability to mobilize people around the world to follow him and his own domestic mobilization. Too. So given the arguments that you鈥檝e made about the causes and consequences and the unfolding of war, are any comments that you鈥檇 like to make about the role of technology now and into the future? Any changes you鈥檇 like to discuss or with respect to Clausewitz?

Sir Hew Strachan:

Well, I mean the beauty to me of Clausewitz is he鈥檚 effectively in a technology-free space!

Audrey Kurth Cronin:

I know.

Sir Hew Strachan:

For somebody who did one year of science in school, this is a great relief. You will say it鈥檚 a great disappointment, I understand that. But鈥 would argue one reason that Clausewitz has continued purchase, is precisely because he鈥檚 not technology-specific. Because in his era, the weaponry for war changed very little. One hundred years before, basically he would recognize the battlefield, and it鈥檚 not going to change dramatically until [the late nineteenth century]. Technology does change the battlefield then. But that means, because he鈥檚 not essentially binding himself to any particular period, he is binding himself very much to the legacy of the French Revolution.

But in many ways, of course, we still live with the impacts of the French Revolution, so that doesn鈥檛 distance himself from us as much as it might otherwise have done. What does this mean though in terms of technology and how you read the Ukrainian War of course is itself interesting, because in many respects, a lot of that war was horribly familiar. I mean other than fighting tank warfare, counter attacks from small groups. I mean there was not here much that was technologically enabled. What I find most striking about the technology change, is back in exactly to your point, it goes exactly back to your point about Afghanistan, is that what technology is doing for us, is mobilizing international support, and it鈥檚 mobilizing popular support, not just in terms of popular interest.

But what鈥檚 really interesting, in British universities and from contacts I鈥檓 having to American universities too, is the academic population is more involved because so much intelligence is open source, is much better informed, much more easily mobilized and is much better at being able to give central input and broadly speaking, certainly in the UK, the government has responded.

Patrick Cronin:

I鈥檓 tempted to come in here and talk about your discussion about fighting limited wars, with unlimited ends, but not unlimited means. Because, and you even suggested, I think, in your remarks here today, Hew, that if we鈥檙e going to defend Zelenskyy in Ukraine, with his existential war, then we ought to have no limits on means. But clearly, that鈥檚 not possible, is it, in the nuclear era?

Sir Hew Strachan:

No and I think part of the problem here, is that Putin has actually, in a way, won a war he actually shouldn鈥檛 have won. Let me explain what I mean. Very early on, he invoked the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons 鈥� without actually it seemed intending to do anything at all. Likely rhetorical as far as we know. That is to say, sure, absolutely all this with fingers crossed and this is part of the problem and that he didn鈥檛, there was no upgrading of levels, there was no movement of missiles.

But of course, that created panic. It was front-line news and for those in government in western countries concerned about the possibility of escalation of the war itself. If you look at what鈥檚 happened since then, the west has escalated its response. Not overtly. Not by blowing its trumpet saying we鈥檙e escalating. But actually just doing things. As it has done those things, there鈥檚 been no response. The West implicitly has established escalation dominance.

But we鈥檙e not talking about nuclear weapons. We鈥檙e not talking about chemical weapons. I think part of Putin鈥檚 victory is to get us worried about nuclear weapons when we don鈥檛 need to be. Again, fingers crossed. Because actually, first, if Putin鈥檚 going to escalate things, he would logically escalate his own military force in very different directions. It would escalate it geographically, be more in the Black Sea, for example. He could conceivably escalate it, because of [NATO鈥檚] Article V, by thinking how best to target the last communication bringing in munitions to the Ukrainians.

Or he could simply escalate it in Ukraine, by using longer-range missiles. He鈥檚 not doing any of that at the moment, and I absolutely get it, you know, war鈥檚 full of uncertainties. There鈥檚 also the realm of risk. If you take too much fear out of this, then presumably we鈥檙e not going to do what is necessary to stop him. So where does that leave us, in terms of limited means? Of course, we can鈥檛 move all the way up, but do we have any idea of where we are going? At the moment, we鈥檙e doing enough to keep Ukraine in the fight. Without support from the United States, especially in trained units鈥� [inaudible].

But how long for? At what scale? What is the cost to U.S. capability? What does it mean if you鈥檙e putting so much into the defense for Ukraine in budgetary terms, for defense budgets domestically in the countries that are supporting Ukraine? We鈥檙e not having any of these discussions that I can see. And we鈥檙e certainly not having them in the United Kingdom鈥�. We鈥檙e still talking about a carrier strike group with global reach. When we actually have two carriers, but we don鈥檛 have two carrier escorts. Where exactly is this going?

Patrick Cronin:

I wonder if we can switch to the consequences of war, and I want to especially press you, Hew, on what you think about the consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, a year after that withdrawal, to the extent you can try to see any long shadow that comes out of that? That鈥檚 difficult at this point, perhaps. But I am struck by your analysis on the fall of empires out of World War I, the onset of the Cold War out of World War II, and the revolutions in Russia and China. Now, maybe in hindsight, we can see all of those things. We couldn鈥檛 see them necessarily in 1919, or 1946 exactly. But what do you think about the post-9/11 wars in general, Iraq and Afghanistan, but especially Afghanistan, given the fact that the withdrawal was met with such controversy and near-term tragedy?

Sir Hew Strachan:

Sure, sure. Well, it鈥檚 very hard to distance I think for anybody who knows Afghanistan reasonably well, to distance themself from the tragedy.

I mean we have been let down, very badly let down. The speed with which we have moved on, distresses me. Distresses many other people, because and I think what we鈥檙e tending to do in policy, for me is sort of devote our attention to the wrong issues. We are concerned understandably about the rights of education; but we always knew that was going to be a problem if the Taliban were back in power. I remember going to meetings and being told by women鈥檚 groups even then saying, 鈥淵ou鈥檝e given us so much. There is so much opportunity that鈥檚 opened up to us. But what will happen? How is this going to be guaranteed?鈥� We had no answers then and we haven鈥檛 got any answers now.

But the humanitarian crisis is far more pressing. Dare I say it? This is not minimizing the importance of education or human rights or the women鈥檚 movement. People are dying of starvation and are dying because there鈥檚 no cash in the economy. 鈥� These are much more fundamental things. At that level, we don鈥檛 seem to be able to move on. We don鈥檛 seem to be able to say, because of reluctance to recognize that Afghanistan is a state, because it is acting as a haven for terrorism. But actually, there are also the needs of the people, back to politics from policy, in terms of what鈥檚 going on.

So that鈥檚 one dimension. What are the regional implications that it will obviously tell us about how that plays out? Pakistan, I suppose, is the key here, in terms of how the current state of Pakistan, the formulation of policy, and apart from that, the disposition of Imran Kahn鈥�. The fact that Pakistan does seem to have moved a bit away from the Taliban in the last few weeks. But it鈥檚 done that before. Where will that lead? Pakistan seems to be our principal entry into Afghanistan; yet what are the implications of course for the other nations, implications for Iran, the implications for Tajikistan. And the real question is first, and we don鈥檛 know this, but if there were to be a reoccurrence of insurgency, and there are reports of some fighters in the Panjshir Valley鈥hat would we do? How would we respond to that? We don鈥檛 know. Once again, we鈥檙e not having that discussion. I think we did entirely the right thing: we, the west, Europe, above all the United States, in saying we鈥檙e going鈥� But should we go into the north and support the opposition of the Taliban鈥�.

鈥his obviously was U.S. policy to be here in the first place. It鈥檚 the U.S. decision entirely to come out and a lot of other countries are committing themselves in the wake of this. Not as directly as the U.S., obviously. But I think the sense of being let down in the United Kingdom, and there was quite a push in the United Kingdom, I think in a way of trying to scrabble together a coalition far too late to do something, but actually being incapable of achieving it. That in itself, the United States should be worried, that鈥f the moment should have come with Ukraine for Europe to step up and do more for its own defense, arguably it should do so. If they really felt they had an obligation, a humanitarian obligation鈥�. There鈥檚 not even a discussion about that.听NATO听failed more catastrophically鈥�.

Patrick Cronin:

I don鈥檛 want to be facile about history and current issues, but it鈥檚 obvious that China, in a major power war, in the concern of a clash over Taiwan, has gripped national attention, in terms of the focus of both policy and discussion, including with our allies and partners. In terms of thinking about that confrontation, obviously the mainland has defined Taiwan unification as an existential issue. Now that鈥檚 a subjective definition by Xi Jinping, because it鈥檚 not objectively true that China will fall, if Taiwan鈥檚 not part of it, because Taiwan has never been part of the听PRC. Nonetheless, maybe that doesn鈥檛 matter.

Meanwhile, the United States is looking at this narrow window鈥攊n this decade, not long in the future, but in this decade鈥攁t the possibility of a military clash over Taiwan. Now whether that could be a prolonged war, or a short war, whether it will happen, or just continue to be protracted political struggle, those are big questions that I don鈥檛 expect you to answer, Hew. But how would you help us听think about听the possibility of great power conflict in the 2020s?

Sir Hew Strachan:

Well, I suppose the easy way out of that question is you know far more about this than I do, Patrick. I would easily pose those questions to you.

But what is striking to me on the historical argument, is the capacity of small powers to trigger the actions of big powers. That for me, is the story here. Taiwan can get the U.S. into a war which it doesn鈥檛 want. I鈥檓 not accusing Taiwan of being manipulative or duplicitous in this. But if I do my analogy stuff鈥攁nd this disregards all the earlier stuff I鈥檝e been saying about the origins of the First World War鈥攖his war begins at a clash in 1914 between Austria and Serbia鈥�. It鈥檚 Serbia who effectively, in its very well justified response to Austria-Hungary, makes sure that Russia, then France, and then Britain get in. Sir Edward Gray, the British foreign secretary at the time, said I do wish we could just take Serbia out of the middle of the sea and sink it. It鈥檚 such a nuisance. He really didn鈥檛 care about Serbia any more than most Brits did. Then in 1939, a small power on the other side of Europe triggers a second global war.

Taiwan sits for me, exactly in that framework. Of course, going back to 1918鈥e recognized the autonomy of states and their rights to determine their own futures. We see it as an important democratic principle. We recognized that in the UN Charter. We recognized it through the massive explosion in the number of states in the UN since 1945, more than tripling of members of states. Not all those states are able to defend themselves and in fact the vast majority are unable to do so. So where does that leave us? That has to leave us either and this comes back to realism and liberalism, essentially.

If you鈥檙e a realist you say, 鈥淭here are so many potential wars out there, you should generally put your hard hat on and go down to the shelter. Stay out of it.鈥� The liberals would say, 鈥淗ow can we let this happen? We have to be everywhere.鈥� So actually in that situation, the liberals would probably lead us into more wars than we want. But there are, so I think, I mean that鈥檚 the concern. Great powers continue to feud over how do you define your responsibilities?

鈥he First World War was caused by the actions of other states. And that did lead to that confrontation鈥�. But that doesn鈥檛 mean it has to happen. One of the reasons it need not happen, is actually ironically, if the United States focuses on its relationship to China, rather than its relationship with Taiwan and equally if China focuses on its relationship with the United States. But if both sides let Taiwan become the center of attention, then they鈥檙e in danger of finding themselves in a situation that leads to confrontation.

Patrick Cronin:

Well to segue way from that very important topic, back to history. But let鈥檚 shift to something that鈥檚 squarely in your wheelhouse, the British way of war. There is this fabulous new book, as you know,听The British Way of War, by Andrew Lambert is it?

Sir Hew Strachan:

Yep.

Patrick Cronin:

You鈥檙e quoted in it, in fact, favorably, early on. But there seems to b5-

Sir Hew Strachan:

[interjects] He hasn鈥檛 read my review.

Patrick Cronin:

Well, I wondered about that, because there is a distinction between your description of the continental commitment of Michael Howard鈥檚 view, versus his view, that there is this British way of war that鈥檚 separate from having a large continental army. I wondered if you could just take us very briefly through this argument about the British Way of War, and why it matters?

Sir Hew Strachan:

Well, why I think it matters now and why Corbett鈥攖his book by Andrew Lambert, for those of you who haven鈥檛 read it, is essentially about Julian Corbett.鈥攊t鈥檚 a biography that comes in two halves. The first half is a discussion of Julian Corbett, especially his ideas, although to my mind there鈥檚 a lack of recognition of the strategic context in the build-up to the First World War. But then the second half is an argument that there was a totally different way of combatting this war, which was in line with what Corbett had been thinking, which reflected of course a genuine debate between governments at the time in 1914 about whether Britain should ever have put an army, or for that matter British soldiers, in Europe. Would they be enough?

And you could have fought it, as Corbett argued in 1911, using sea power and having the privilege with Ireland鈥攁s the United States has maritime separation from other countries (not from the north and south, but in terms of its immediate competitors). And therefore, you take as much or as little of the land war as you want to, because it鈥檚 a maritime conflict, and that Britain could have sustained that strategy.

I just think the argument itself is unsustainable. War was of a scale that actually Britain听did听have to put in its own ground forces and fight a land war, while [Prime Minister David] Lloyd George, who was well-versed in maritime strategy, never embraced it. I mean he did embrace it, but he embraced the need for continental commitment as well鈥�.

Corbett became the official naval historian of the First World War and wrote the first three volumes of the official history鈥hich were not completed. He died. Andrew Lambert retitles them [inaudible 00:37:53], paraphrase, [inaudible 00:37:55] this is what it is. It isn鈥檛. I mean it simply isn鈥檛 that. Nor is Corbett thinking in those terms, or if he is thinking in those terms, I can鈥檛 see the evidence. He doesn鈥檛, I mean it would be good. There is a sense that comes out of that, which is what [B. H..] Liddell Hart picks up (Liddell Hart was a plagiarist of Julian Corbett鈥檚 arguments). But there is an argument that that is the sort of war you should have fought, and it鈥檚 certainly the argument that many people thought we should have fought in the 1920s and 鈥�30s, that Liddell Hart then carries through to the Second World War.

But again, it鈥檚 actions and circumstances. This is the problem with the United States, is that circumstances of being a great power very often leaves you with very little choice about armed conflict. And as the Duke of Wellington famously said in 1838, and I am tempted to say the same thing about Afghanistan鈥�, there is no such thing as a little war for a great nation. 鈥� So I鈥檓 delighted Andrew鈥檚 written it. I鈥檝e learned a great deal from it. But I do get very confused by it鈥�.

Patrick Cronin:

Now Hew, you famously set up the Changing Character of War Program, a truly interdisciplinary program at Oxford University.

Sir Hew Strachan:

Well, thanks a lot.

Patrick Cronin:

You are a dedicated historian, so I鈥檓 wondering: What have you learned from the other disciplines beyond history and what can history really bring to the world today? You鈥檝e brought so much with your work; but how would you answer this question about history in a couple of minutes?

Sir Hew Strachan:

I learned an enormous amount and initially, somewhat against my expectation and will, about this interdisciplinary approach to war. This has absolutely changed my thinking, because I learned from philosophers, from political scientists, from lawyers on international law. How do we define war? Well interdisciplinarity is an essential tool鈥�. Thanks to the growth of international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict, the definition of war is essential, too. So absolutely, war leads into interdisciplinary study.

What does history specifically have to contribute? I think there are probably three things. One is (and this is not an original idea) that as one of the core disciplines, military history when it comes to study of war, is the only one that looks exclusively at war. International law looks at other things. Philosophy is certainly concerned with many other things. There were moments in some of those debates that Audrey and I sat in, when you slightly wondered whether the speculation if a bear walks over a cliff and there鈥檚 a human being underneath that is hurt how responsible is the bear鈥攚hen you wondered how exactly that related to war.

I have to say very quickly to my philosophy friends, most of them are not like that, but there were one or two times when you sort of wondered. But military history is concerned with war, in one form or another, at its heart. No other discipline, because I actually think strategic studies in itself is an amalgam and especially influenced by Michael Howard鈥檚 legacy, if you think he disputed the value of undergraduate war studies precisely because it was a practical discipline. It is sufficient to say that his way of thinking was that military history is absolutely essential, and I think we鈥檝e lost sight of that history, to our cost.

Because what military history does is, the second point: it gives context and perspective beyond the immediate. It gives a sense of what really is pressing now that is different. If I can put this in very personal terms, when the invasion began on the 24th of February, and someone asked me to make a comment and I said, 鈥淲ell I鈥檓 not a, I don鈥檛 know Russia. I am certainly not a Ukrainian specialist.鈥� And the kickback was, yes, but we all do think about war and of course, I did find I had reactions鈥�. But then the next question was, 鈥淲ere you surprised?鈥� The answer is, 鈥淲as I surprised? Yes, I was, but I wasn鈥檛 shocked.鈥� Because in the end鈥nd just because of how the experience of wars happens in history, you are not surprised. But you still are surprised, or shocked in the sense that this happened now. I think somehow you think it won鈥檛 happen again. So there鈥檚 that element.

The third point and I don鈥檛 have any experience鈥s that鈥n the 20th century, we have valued quite rightly the experience of those who have seen war and combat, firsthand. For whom this is an experience, this is not vicarious, but real and life-lasting. What this initially does, is it gives context to that experience. It helps us understand it. It helps those who have experienced it, to put it in context and it helps those who know those who experienced it, put it in context. That adds value to the experience itself.

Patrick Cronin:

Well, we鈥檙e out of time and I want to thank you so much for your insights. There have only been six Chichele professors who have studied, focused on military history and modern war at Oxford, in more than 100 or so years. That鈥檚 quite a tribute, in terms of those individuals, what they鈥檝e left. I鈥檓 reminded of the words of Cyril Falls when he was writing one of his books,听100 Years of War: 1850-1950. He said, 鈥漈he author does not intend to wear the sad clothing of excessive modesty. 30 years of reading military history ought to be an asset of a certain value.鈥� Well, I hate to say it, but you鈥檙e following in his footsteps. You have shown amply I think, Hew, that the value of history and military history, have a lot to say and thank you so much for your scholarship. Thank you for your presence today and on behalf of 小蓝视频 and Hudson Institute, thank you to Hew Strachan.

Sir Hew Strachan:

Thank you very much.